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Trading Proportionality for Strategic Robustness in Multi-Winner Approval Voting
Classical strategyproofness assumes a manipulator either knows how everyone else votes or is willing to gamble as if they did. Real voters rarely do. The recently introduced RAT-degree measures how many other participants' reports an agent must actually observe before a manipulation becomes strictly
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