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Evolutionary Analysis of Continuous-time Finite-state Mean Field Games with Discounted Payoffs
We consider a class of continuous-time dynamic games involving a large number of players. Each player selects actions from a finite set and evolves through a finite set of states. State transitions occur stochastically and depend on the player's chosen action. A player's single-stage reward depends
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