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Timely Persuasion with Opposing Senders: When Does Competition Help the Receiver?
computer-science-and-game-theoryinformation-theorynetworking-and-internet-architecturesignal-processingsystems-and-control
Status updates let a receiver track a changing process, but a sender that controls when they are sent can steer the receiver's estimate without misreporting. We study competition between two such senders with opposing preferences, who report on a binary continuous-time Markov chain using state-depen
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