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Learning in Continuous Games from Pairwise Preference Feedback
We study learning in continuous games when players receive only pairwise preference feedback, revealing which of two actions is preferred but neither payoff values nor preference magnitudes. We first show that standard external regret and coarse correlated equilibria (CCE) are not identifiable from
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