arXiv (All)
open access
Payment Design under Belief Disagreement: Rent Placement, Bid Resolution, and Auction Choice
When auction bidders misperceive their rivals, a seller can change not only the amount of information rent but also the states in which it is delivered. We ask when this payment-design opportunity survives a finite bidding interface, nonnegative-payment restrictions, and comparison with conventional
Conceptio Open Archive
Analyze & explore related research in Conceptio
Connect this record directly into your research workflow or AI agent. Explore citations across open repositories, query full text, and export structured proof bundles.
This document is indexed with metadata only: full text is not available in the archive for this record. Open the official source ↗
Related documents
- The effect of corruption on bidding behavior in first-price auctions#467856
- Simultaneous Ascending Bid Auctions with Budget Constraints#942251
- Imposing Monotonicity Nonparametrically in First-Price Auctions#1278228
- Continuous auction models#1064189
- DP18976: The Price of Unpredictability: Scheduling Demands, Gender and Selection in the Gig Economy#1175274
Record · ID 1201663
Retrieved via Conceptio: every document is proof-bundled with source, license, and retrieval metadata.
Retrieved via Conceptio: every document is proof-bundled with source, license, and retrieval metadata.
Bring this data into your agent: Connect via MCP or API · 20 free credits to start · no card required
Read the Docs → · View CLI source on GitHub · Conceptio Open Knowledge Archive
Read the Docs → · View CLI source on GitHub · Conceptio Open Knowledge Archive