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Randomization and Efficiency under Incomplete Information
We study ex-ante Pareto efficiency of feasible outcomes in games with incomplete information. Our main observation is that excessive randomization leads to inefficiency. With a nonatomic prior, generically, efficient outcomes are pure almost surely. In finite state spaces, the restriction is weaker:
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