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Dynamical low-rank equilibrium computation for stochastic games between advanced persistent threats and moving target defense
Moving target defense (MTD) against advanced persistent threats (APTs) in industrial control systems (ICS) has well-established game-theoretic formulations, but their practical value hinges on equilibrium computation: full-rank value iteration is prohibitively expensive at industrial state dimension
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