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Competitive One-Step-Ahead Control of Friedkin--Johnsen Networks: Potential Games, Stability, and the Price of Competition
This paper studies competitive one-step-ahead control of Friedkin-Johnsen networks with overlapping player influence. The one-step interaction is an exact potential game with a unique Nash equilibrium obtained from a symmetric positive-definite system. Sequential best-response sweeps converge for ev
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