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TMT: Runtime Backdoor Detection for Vision-Language-Action Policies on Unseen Tasks
Backdoored vision-language-action (VLA) policies can preserve benign task performance while producing malicious actions when a trigger appears. Detecting such activation is difficult because malicious behavior can comprise individually plausible actions, while unfamiliar tasks introduce legitimate c
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