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Protecting Losers Undermines Auction Credibility
A second-price auction must determine its price but need not learn how far losing values lie below it. We show that protecting this information from the seller conflicts with auction credibility. In deterministic protocols with private communication, lower-tail privacy forces the first informative q
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