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On the Generic Finiteness of Equilibrium Outcome Distributions in Bimatrix Game Forms
We provide an example of an outcome game form with two players for which there is in an open set of utilities for both players such that, in each of the associated games, the set of mixed Nash equilibria induces a continuum of outcome distributions.
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