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Competitors In Merger Control: Shall They Be Merely Heard Or Also Listened To?
There are legal grounds to hear competitors in merger control proceedings, and competitor involvement has gained significance. To what extent this is economically sensible is the focus of our game-theoretic analysis. The competition authority applies some welfare standard while the competitor cares
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