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Who and How? Adverse Selection and flexible Moral Hazard
We characterize incentive-compatible mechanisms in environments with hidden types and flexible hidden actions. Our approach introduces extended recommendation schedules that also prescribe actions off path, after misreports. This yields a tractable and complete characterization of incentive compatib
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