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Contracting against a Non-contractible Outsider
I study a general framework of contracting with externalities involving a non-contractible outsider. Strategic symmetry between the insider agent and the outsider is the source of multiple equilibria, even when their actions are strategic substitutes. To tackle strategic uncertainty, the principal g
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