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Cycle structure of best-response dynamics in random bimatrix games
We study the best-response dynamics in games with random payoffs. We consider two-player bimatrix games, with $n$ strategies each. We assume that payoffs come from a continuous distribution, and study the best-response dynamics of these games, after imposing some structure on their payoff matrices.
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