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Pareto Inefficiency of EFX
We consider the problem of allocating indivisible goods to agents with additive valuations, under two classic notions of fairness and efficiency: envy-freeness up to any good (EFX) and Pareto optimality. While some of the earliest work on EFX showed that Pareto optimal EFX allocations may not exist
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