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Stable matching under regulation
In a market in which any coalition can reach agreements, a stable outcome need not exist even when agents have substitutable preferences. We show how regulation can restore stability. If a regulator participates in every agreement, a setwise stable outcome exists when each ordinary agent's preferenc
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