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A Characterization of Quantile Stable Matchings in Many-to-Many Markets
We study two-sided many-to-many matching markets where agents' preferences satisfy strong substitutability and the law of aggregate demand (LAD). In this framework, the set of stable matchings forms a finite distributive lattice, and quantile stable matchings exist and satisfy the polarization of in
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