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BROCADE: Broker-based Contract Design for the Multi-Agency Model
We study welfare maximization in a contract model with $m$ principals who privately value a public project's success and $n$ agents whose costly effort is unobservable. Contracts induce truthful dominant strategies for principals and equilibrium effort by agents, maximizing the expected total value
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