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Sybil-Proofness of Generalized Adaptive Clinching and Implications for Blockchain Mechanism Design
The adaptive clinching auction of Dobzinski, Lavi, and Nisan (FOCS'08) is a cornerstone of mechanism design with budget-constrained bidders, and it has since inspired a broad range of extensions to substantially richer market settings. Adaptive clinching enjoys compelling guarantees: it is Pareto op
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