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Characterizing Maximum Nash Welfare: Envy-Freeness and Proportionality
When allocating indivisible goods, the maximum Nash welfare rule is known to be the unique welfarist rule satisfying envy-freeness up to one good. We strengthen this characterization by showing that envy-freeness up to one good can be replaced by substantially weaker fairness requirements: envy-free
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