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Fragmented Obedient Equilibria in Routing Games
We study routing games in which competing mediators recommend routes to fixed nonatomic populations. Each mediator chooses a randomized flow allocation to minimize its population's expected travel cost, subject to users having no conditional expected gain above a tolerance $ε$ from disregarding thei
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