HAL (France)
open access
Reputation for competence in a cheap-talk setting
This paper develops a uniform-quadratic cheap-talk setting of Crawford add Sobel (1982), in which the sender may be uninformed and cares about his reputation for competence (that is, for being informed). We establish the existence of a partition equilibrium with two messages and show how this equili
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