Beyond Duality: Truth, Falsehood, and the Emptiness of Being

This paper examines the relationship between truth, falsehood, and the ontological concept of emptiness, questioning whether these categories can be adequately understood through rigid binary oppositions. It explores the limitations of treating truth and falsehood as mutually exclusive and self-sufficient determinations, while considering how their meaning emerges within broader conceptual and relational contexts. The inquiry approaches emptiness not as absolute nothingness or the negation of existence, but as a philosophical challenge to the assumption that phenomena possess fixed, independent essences. From this perspective, distinctions between being and non-being, affirmation and negation, and truth and error are examined in relation to the conditions that make them intelligible. Rather than dissolving logical distinctions or equating contradictory claims, the discussion investigates the possibility of preserving meaningful differentiation without assigning metaphysical absoluteness to its conceptual boundaries. By bringing together questions of ontology, epistemology, and philosophical logic, the paper seeks to clarify the relationship between conceptual duality, the nature of truth, and the emptiness of being.