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Collusion-proof Auction Design using Side Information
Bidder collusion degrades welfare and fairness in standard auctions. To address this, we introduce the Conditional-Posted Price (C-PoP) mechanism, a collusion-resilient design that uses machine learning classifiers to predict, even imprecisely, which bidders are colluding. C-PoP computes Posted Pric
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