Multi-Winner Voting with Argumentative Ballots

[2608.23247] Multi-Winner Voting with Argumentative Ballots Skip to main content Search Submit Donate Log in Computer Science > Computer Science and Game Theory arXiv:2608.23247 (cs) [Submitted on 24 Aug 2026 ( v1 ), last revised 28 Aug 2026 (this version, v2)] Title: Multi-Winner Voting with Argumentative Ballots Authors: Ryuta Arisaka , Hirotaka Ono View PDF HTML (experimental) Abstract: We introduce multi-winner voting with argumentative ballots (MVArg) and investigate theoretical properties. As our conceptual contribution, we generalise approval ballots to argumentative ballots, thereby allowing voters to express defeasible preferences over candidates. We accordingly generalise voter cohesion and justified representation axioms JR, PJR and EJR. As our theoretical contribution, we establish several key results. First, MVArg is strictly more expressive than multi-winner voting with approval ballots (MV). Second, our notions of cohesion and justified representation are conservative generalisations of their counterparts in MV. Third, the MVArg counterpart of JR can always be satisfied, whereas the counterparts of PJR and EJR cannot always be. Fourth, although verifying whether a winner set satisfies the MVArg counterpart of JR is already coNP-hard, such a winner set can be constructed in polynomial time. All definitions, propositions, auxiliary lemmas and theorems have been formalised and mechanically checked in Lean 4. Comments: Corrected Example 1, reflected the update to page 6's counts of winner sets proving axioms for the robust h. No definitions, propositions, lemmas, theorems are affected Subjects: Computer Science and Game Theory (cs.GT) ; Artificial Intelligence (cs.AI) Cite as: arXiv:2608.23247 [cs.GT] (or arXiv:2608.23247v2 [cs.GT] for this version) https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2608.23247 Focus to learn more arXiv-issued DOI via DataCite Submission history From: Ryuta Arisaka [ view email ] [v1] Mon, 24 Aug 2026 13:39:05 UTC (714 KB) [v2] Fri, 28 Aug 2026 10:05:50 UTC (527 KB) Full-text links: Access Paper: View PDF HTML (experimental) TeX Source view license Current browse context: cs.GT < prev | next > new | recent | 2026-08 Change to browse by: cs cs.AI References & Citations NASA ADS Google Scholar Semantic Scholar export BibTeX citation Bookmark Bibliographic Tools Bibliographic and Citation Tools Bibliographic Explorer Toggle Bibliographic Explorer ( What is the Explorer? ) Connected Papers Toggle Connected Papers ( What is Connected Papers? ) Litmaps Toggle Litmaps ( What is Litmaps? ) scite.ai Toggle scite Smart Citations ( What are Smart Citations? ) Code, Data, Media Code, Data and Media Associated with this Article alphaXiv Toggle alphaXiv ( What is alphaXiv? ) Links to Code Toggle CatalyzeX Code Finder for Papers ( What is CatalyzeX? ) DagsHub Toggle DagsHub ( What is DagsHub? ) GotitPub Toggle Gotit.pub ( What is GotitPub? ) Huggingface Toggle Hugging Face ( What is Huggingface? ) ScienceCast Toggle ScienceCast ( What is ScienceCast? ) Demos Demos Replicate Toggle Replicate ( What is Replicate? ) Spaces Toggle Hugging Face Spaces ( What is Spaces? ) Spaces Toggle TXYZ.AI ( What is TXYZ.AI? ) Related Papers Recommenders and Search Tools Link to Influence Flower Influence Flower ( What are Influence Flowers? ) Core recommender toggle CORE Recommender ( What is CORE? ) Author Venue Institution Topic About arXivLabs arXivLabs: experimental projects with community collaborators arXivLabs is a framework that allows collaborators to develop and share new arXiv features directly on our website. Both individuals and organizations that work with arXivLabs have embraced and accepted our values of openness, community, excellence, and user data privacy. arXiv is committed to these values and only works with partners that adhere to them. Have an idea for a project that will add value for arXiv's community? Learn more about arXivLabs . Which authors of this paper are endorsers? | Disable MathJax ( What is MathJax? ) We gratefully acknowledge support from our major funders , member institutions , and all contributors. About · Help · Contact · Subscribe · Copyright · Privacy · Accessibility · Operational Status (opens in new tab) Major funding support from

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