The Methodological Mirage

This paper introduces Egozy’s Theorem: the formal claim that thought experiments, as intra-subjective simulations operating entirely within the first-person phenomenal domain (D1), cannot generate justified conclusions about the phenomenal states of external minds (Dn). This is a general methodological theorem about a class of philosophical tools, not a claim about any particular mind or system. To ground the theorem, we develop a three-domain taxonomy of epistemic access — D1 (primary subjectivity), D2 (shared objectivity), and Dn (inferred perspectives) — and demonstrate that the inferential gap between D1 and Dn is constitutive and unbridgeable by introspection alone. We apply the theorem across four thought experiments as initial cases: Jackson’s Mary’s Room (ally), Chalmers’ Philosophical Zombie (nuanced), Block’s China Brain (full application), and Davidson’s Swampman (straightforward case). We then give dedicated treatment to Searle’s Chinese Room as the paradigm case. The theorem identifies a methodological disqualification; the D1 observer-dependency it predicts is demonstrated concretely through the Positronic Humanoid (Agent P); and the argument is further undermined by the actual behavior of real AI systems, which have moved well beyond the architecture Searle’s thought experiment was built against. We conclude that the Chinese Room does not succeed epistemically with respect to Dn conclusions, is methodologically self-undermining when it attempts to block the counter-proof, and does not adequately address the real-world phenomenon it purports to analyze.