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From the Social Choice Problem to a Collusion-Proof Tendering Mechanism for Dynamic Stochastic Projects
The VCG family and the AGV mechanism are two classical approaches to efficient implementation in the static social choice problem. In 2024, Csóka et al. showed that AGV has critical weaknesses. In contrast, the transferable-utility Guaranteed Utility Mechanism (TU-GUM) retains all the standard desir
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