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Almost Envy-Freeness for Additive Mixed Manna with Entitlements: Deterministic and Randomized Guarantees
We investigate the fair allocation of indivisible items among agents with asymmetric entitlements in mixed manna settings, where the items consist of both goods and chores. For additive valuations, we establish that weighted envy-free up to one item (WEF1) allocations always exist and can be compute
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