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Sparse Disapproval Guarantees a Nonempty Hare Core
An approval committee is Hare-core stable if no coalition meeting the Hare quota can strictly improve by moving to another candidate set. Whether every approval election has such a committee remains open. We prove nonemptiness when each voter disapproves at most two candidates, with no bounds on the
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