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The Deterministic Hare Core Is Nonempty for Nine-Seat Approval Elections
Core stability gives approval-based committee elections a strong form of coalitional proportionality, but deterministic existence is not known for an arbitrary number of seats. We prove that every finite election with nine seats has a deterministic Hare-quota core committee. Starting from an eight-s
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