NYU Faculty Digital Archive
metadata only
An Equilibrium Approach to International Merger Policy
treat international merger policy as a repeated veto game. I show that there exists a unique efficient equilibrium within a particular class of trigger strategy equilibria. I then consider a series of comparative statics and extensions: (a) if for some exogenous reason one of the countries becomes m
Conceptio Open Archive
Analyze & explore related research in Conceptio
Connect this record directly into your research workflow or AI agent. Explore citations across open repositories, query full text, and export structured proof bundles.
This document is indexed with metadata only: full text is not available in the archive for this record. Open the official source ↗
Related documents
- The Q-Theory of Mergers#942730
- Value relevance of deferred taxes in mergers and acquisitions#958052
- Constructions for positional games and applications to domination games / Ali Deniz Bagdas, Dennis Clemens, Fabian Hamann, Yannick Mogge#921993
- Cross Holding and Imperfect Product Markets#942329
- Incentive Design for Multi-Agent Systems: A Bilevel Optimization Framework for Coordinating Independent Agents and Convergence Analysis#1062611
Record · ID 942236
Retrieved via Conceptio: every document is proof-bundled with source, license, and retrieval metadata.
Retrieved via Conceptio: every document is proof-bundled with source, license, and retrieval metadata.
Bring this data into your agent: Connect via MCP or API · 20 free credits to start · no card required
Read the Docs → · View CLI source on GitHub · Conceptio Open Knowledge Archive
Read the Docs → · View CLI source on GitHub · Conceptio Open Knowledge Archive