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Cross Holding and Imperfect Product Markets
We consider a two stage game where two firms first take positions in each other's equity (cross holding) and next compete in an imperfect product market. When the firms' products are substitutes, the optimal cross holding involves a short position in the competitor's equity, resulting in an equilibr
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