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Cognitive System Phenomenology — A Critique of Husserl (Part Eight)
In this section, we will develop the theory of Signification within the framework of Cognitive System Phenomenology (here we mainly consider content signification; other forms of signification will be discussed later). Different cognitive systems lead to different transcendental egos, forming what I call a transcendental ego group. Each element within this group has a distinct way of signifying objects. The three most basic types of signification are: affirmative signification, possible signification, and negative signification. We must point out that our signification is not directed toward objects within consciousness, which makes it fundamentally different from Husserl’s. In fact, although Husserl believed his signification was directed at objects in consciousness, in essence, his signification also refers to transcendent objects, because it is impossible to signify an object that exists purely in consciousness. Thus, Husserl cannot truly “bracket” the external world (a conclusion that seems to shake the very foundation of his entire theory). We will explain why later. Through original intuition, we obtain a planar object; through spatialized re-intuition, we obtain a spatial object. Now we must ask—what exactly is this spatial object? This is the process of content signification. The content signification of an object is the conceptual definition of its content. We can imagine that this process is quite natural. The need to “signify” is also natural: if I wish to know something placed before me, I naturally want to know what it is. This is the most basic epistemological problem. It fully demonstrates the reasonableness and necessity of establishing a theory of signification. Beyond content signification, there are many other forms of signification (though content signification is the most important one). The broadest and most profound type of signification is what I call the trans-existential signification, related to my concept of super-existence. I believe the introduction of the super-existence concept is extremely important, for it will inevitably influence all disciplines. We will discuss the super-existence of objects later.
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