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Strategic Facility Location in Euclidean Spaces
The strategic facility location problem is defined as follows: $n$ agents report their location in a metric space, and the objective is to design a \emph{mechanism} deciding the (possibly randomized) location of a facility such that agents have no incentive to lie about their position. We focus on t
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