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Incentivizing Agents through Ratings: The Value of Randomization
I study the optimal design of ratings to motivate an agent's investment in quality when transfers are unavailable. The principal designs a (possibly stochastic) rating scheme that maps quality to a distribution over signals. The agent privately knows his ability and chooses a quality level. A compet
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