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Do Large Language Model Voters Strategize? An Oracle-Based Benchmark for Manipulation under Voting Rules
Strategic voting is a canonical failure mode for collective choice: a voter may obtain a more preferred outcome by reporting a ballot that differs from its true preferences. This paper introduces an oracle-based benchmark for testing whether large language model (LLM) voters can discover and execute
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