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Plan-Driven Adaptive Bidding for First-Price Auctions with Budget Constraints under Nonstationarity
We study budget pacing in repeated first-price auctions when an advertiser's private-value distributions change over time and the stationary competing-bid distribution is unknown. We ask how a feasible expenditure plan should enter online bid shading, learning, and hard budget control. We establish
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