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Sequential Phragmén Guarantees 2-Approximate Core Stability
In an approval-based committee election, a committee of size $k$ is selected from a set of candidates to represent voters of total weight $n$, each of whom has positive weight and approves a subset of the candidates. A size-$k$ committee is $λ$-stable if, for every nonempty subset $T$ of candidates,
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