arXiv (OAI Expanded)
open access
Very Justified Envy
This paper studies the intensity of priority violations in matching markets. An agent is said to have very justified envy if she prefers another agent's match to her own and her priority advantage for the object exceeds $k$ ranks. I show that unless $k$ is prohibitively large, Pareto efficiency is i
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