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Minimax Last-Iterate Convergence in Matrix Games with Observed Actions
We study last-iterate convergence in unknown two-player zero-sum matrix games with bandit payoff feedback and observed opponent actions. For games with $d$ actions per player, we develop an algorithm achieving a duality gap of $\widetilde{\mathcal{O}}(\sqrt{d/t})$ with high probability, simultaneous
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