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Approximating Combinatorial Contracts with Arbitrary Costs
We study single-agent combinatorial contracts under linear payments. Under a reward share $α\in[0,1]$, an agent chooses a subset $S$ of $n$ hidden actions, generating reward $f(S)$ at cost $c(S)$, to maximize $αf(S)-c(S)$, while the principal receives $(1-α)f(S)$. For nonnegative additive rewards an
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