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Sender-Receiver Games with Payment Commitments
We study sender-receiver games in which players commit, before the state is drawn, to payments contingent on the subsequently verified state and the receiver's action. Payments may be transferred or burned, serving as contractual guarantees or promised tips. We analyze equilibrium guarantees, welfar
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