arXiv (All)
open access
Equilibrium Computation in Extensive-Form Games with Stochastic Action Sets
Extensive-form games (EFGs) are a standard model for sequential decision-making in games. A fundamental and typically implicit assumption in EFGs is that players always have access to all of their actions at every decision point. However, in many settings, certain actions might be unavailable during
Conceptio Open Archive
Analyze & explore related research in Conceptio
Connect this record directly into your research workflow or AI agent. Explore citations across open repositories, query full text, and export structured proof bundles.
This document is indexed with metadata only: full text is not available in the archive for this record. Open the official source ↗
Related documents
- Disagreeing About What the Buyer Might Learn#1117769
- Randomization and Efficiency under Incomplete Information#1201927
- Large Language Models and Games: A Survey and Roadmap#328706
- The Incompleteness of Game Theory in Light of the Universal Formula of Natural Laws#81561
- Non-hierarchical signalling: two-stage financing game#1274417
Record · ID 1326315
Retrieved via Conceptio: every document is proof-bundled with source, license, and retrieval metadata.
Retrieved via Conceptio: every document is proof-bundled with source, license, and retrieval metadata.
Bring this data into your agent: Connect via MCP or API · 20 free credits to start · no card required
Read the Docs → · View CLI source on GitHub · Conceptio Open Knowledge Archive
Read the Docs → · View CLI source on GitHub · Conceptio Open Knowledge Archive