arXiv (All)
open access
Strategic Multi-Agent Resource Allocation via Statistical Contracts
We study a class of strategic hypothesis testing problems in which a principal aims to allocate resources among competing agents who possess data or data-generating mechanisms that may be relevant to the principal's goals. Each agent can pay a participation cost to opt into a statistical contract, i
Conceptio Open Archive
Analyze & explore related research in Conceptio
Connect this record directly into your research workflow or AI agent. Explore citations across open repositories, query full text, and export structured proof bundles.
This document is indexed with metadata only: full text is not available in the archive for this record. Open the official source ↗
Related documents
- Multi-Principal Competition for an Exclusive Agent: characterization and approximation of Nash Equilibria#927716
- The optimal multi-stage contest#499967
- Tractability and Detail-Neutrality in Incentive Contracting#942859
- Large-Market Discipline in Combinatorial Double Auctions: No Assembly, Bundle Selection, and Complementarities#615150
- Large-Market Discipline in Combinatorial Double Auctions: No Assembly, Bundle Selection, and Complementarities#614183
Record · ID 1343849
Retrieved via Conceptio: every document is proof-bundled with source, license, and retrieval metadata.
Retrieved via Conceptio: every document is proof-bundled with source, license, and retrieval metadata.
Bring this data into your agent: Connect via MCP or API · 20 free credits to start · no card required
Read the Docs → · View CLI source on GitHub · Conceptio Open Knowledge Archive
Read the Docs → · View CLI source on GitHub · Conceptio Open Knowledge Archive