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Tree Plurality Veto: Voting in Few Rounds with Efficient Communication and Low Metric Distortion
artificial-intelligencecomputer-science-and-game-theorydata-structures-and-algorithmsdiscrete-mathematics
We consider the metric distortion framework for voting, where $n$ voters and $m$ candidates are embedded in an unknown metric space. A voting rule selects a candidate using only voters' ordinal preferences, and its distortion is the worst-case ratio between the social cost of the selected candidate
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