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Fixed Sets and the Hardness of Computing Correlated Equilibria
computational-complexitycomputer-science-and-game-theorydata-structures-and-algorithmsmachine-learning
We show that computing an approximate correlated equilibrium of a polytope game is PPAD-complete, and thus polynomial-time equivalent to finding a Nash equilibrium. This challenges the conventional view in game theory that correlated equilibria are more tractable objects than Nash equilibria. From a
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