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Matching Tasks to Agents: Mechanism Design for Multi-Agent Contracts
We study task assignment under adverse selection and moral hazard. In the single-task setting, agents privately know their types, which determine their success probabilities and effort costs. Based on the agents' reported types, the principal selects an agent to perform the task and offers a success
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