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Approximate Envy-Freeness and Pareto Optimality Beyond Additivity
We study the compatibility of envy-freeness up to one good (EF1) and Pareto optimality (PO) beyond additive valuations. For two agents with monotone submodular valuations, we prove that a $2/3$-EF1+PO allocation always exists, while for every $α>3/4$, an $α$-EF1+PO allocation may fail to exist even
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