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Refundable Deposits: How to Restore Cooperation in Finitely Repeated Games
While infinitely repeated games admit a rich set of Nash equilibria, finitely repeated games typically have a much smaller and often inefficient one. We show how to enlarge this set using deposits: in each period a player may place a refundable sum with a neutral intermediary, returned when the game
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